Bankruptcy Rules And Coalitional Manipulation
In this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2005), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T) rule, the constrained equal-awards (A) rule and the constrained equal-losses (L) rule. We show that all rules within the TAL-family are partially non-manipulable and identify the domain of problems where each rule is either non-manipulable by merging or non-manipulable by splitting. We also show that they can be ranked in terms of their relative non-manipulability, according to the parameter that generates the family.
Volume (Year): 09 (2007)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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