Solution Mechanisms For Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games
Cooperative stochastic differential games constitute a highly complex form of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, interactions between strategic behaviors, dynamic evolution, stochastic elements and solution agreement have to be considered simultaneously. This complexity leads to great difficulties in the derivation of dynamically stable solutions. Despite urgent calls for cooperation in the global economy, the lack of formal analyses has precluded rigorous analysis of this problem. In this paper, mechanisms for the derivation of dynamically stable solutions to cooperative stochastic differential games are presented. Games with transferable payoffs and those with nontransferable payoffs are considered. Numerical illustrations are also provided.
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Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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