Marine Shipping Trade And Invasive Species Management Strategies
Addressing the international threat of invasive species to biodiversity worldwide requires an international context due to the nature of the transboundary pollution. This paper presents a comparison of strategies to address the invasive species problem in noncooperative versus cooperative differential games. Asymmetry between the countries in terms of abatement costs and damages enables the investigation of sharing rules under cooperation. The empirical analysis includes data of maritime trade as a vector of invasive species pollution at ports along the Pacific coast of NAFTA countries. The Chander/Tulkens cost sharing rule induces countries to cooperate and achieve lower invasive species stock than under noncooperation.
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Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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