Deadline Effects In Sequential Bargaining — An Experimental Study
This paper reports on an experiment designed to explore the robustness of the deadline effect in multi period bargaining games using constant and decreasing pies, different time horizons, and constant and alternating roles. Our results indicate that decreasing pies and alternating roles lead to earlier agreements (i.e., attenuate the deadline effect) although only alternating roles significantly reduce the number of conflicts.
Volume (Year): 07 (2005)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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