Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsPolitical budget cycles; Transition countries; Electoral rules; Forms of government; Checks and balances;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- P52 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
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