IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/voj/journl/v54y2007i1p5-27.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does Political Instability lead to higher and more volatile inflation? A Panel Data Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Ari Aisen

    () (International Monetary Fund)

  • Francisco José Veiga

    () (Universidade do Minho - NIPE)

Abstract

Economists generally accept the proposition that high and volatile inflation rates generate inefficiencies that reduce societys welfare. Furthermore, studies have shown that inflation is harmful to economic growth. However, determining the causes of the worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences is an important challenge not yet satisfactorily confronted by the profession. Based on a broad dataset covering over 100 countries for the period 1975-1997 and using dynamic and static panel data econometric techniques, this paper shows that a higher degree of political instability is associated with both higher inflation levels and volatility. Not only does this paper advance the political economy literature establishing a relationship between inflation moments and political instability, but it also has important policy implications regarding the optimal design of inflation stabilization programs and of the institutions favorable to price stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Ari Aisen & Francisco José Veiga, 2007. "Does Political Instability lead to higher and more volatile inflation? A Panel Data Analysis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 54(1), pages 5-27, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:voj:journl:v:54:y:2007:i:1:p:5-27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.panoeconomicus.rs/casopis/petibroj/AISEN%20%20VEIGA%20Da%20li%20politicka%20nestabilnost%20vodi%20ka%20visoj%20i%20promenljivoj%20inflaciji.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francisco José Veiga, 2000. "Delays of Inflation Stabilizations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 275-295, November.
    2. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 837-880, September.
    3. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    5. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
    6. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    7. Jose Veiga, Francisco, 1999. "What causes the failure of inflation stabilization plans?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 169-194, February.
    8. Carlos A. Végh, 1989. "Government Spending and Inflationary Finance: A Public Finance Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 657-677, September.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    10. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Adriana Arreaza Coll & Luis Enrique Pedauga, 2007. "Instituciones, estructura económica y política económica: ¿qué hay detrás de la inflación en América Latina?," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(1), pages 7-48, enero-mar.
    2. Krause, Stefan & Méndez, Fabio, 2008. "Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 282-307, March.
    3. Roy, Ripon & Rahman, Md. Mokhlesur, 2014. "An empirical analysis of remittance – inflation relationship in Bangladesh: post-floating exchange rate scenario," MPRA Paper 55190, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Adriana Arreaza Coll & Luis Enrique Pedauga, 2007. "Instituciones, estructura económica y política económica: ¿qué hay detrás de la inflación en América Latina?," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(1), pages 7-48, enero-mar.
    5. Khani Hoolari, Seyed Morteza & Abounoori, Abbas Ali & Mohammadi, Teymour, 2014. "The Effect of Governance and Political Instability Determinants on Inflation in Iran," MPRA Paper 55827, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2014.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflation; Volatility; Political instability; Institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:voj:journl:v:54:y:2007:i:1:p:5-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ivana Horvat). General contact details of provider: http://www.panoeconomicus.rs/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.