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Early Versus Late Effort in Dynamic Agencies with Unverifiable Information

  • Jens Robert Schöndube

    ()

    (Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

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    In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the first period. This observation is assumed to be non-verifiable information. We compare long-term contracts with short-term contracts with respect to their suitability to motivate effort in both periods. On the one hand, short-term contracts allow for a better fine-tuning of second-period incentives as they can be aligned with the agent's second-period productivity. On the other hand, in short-term contracts first-period effort incentives might be distorted as contracts have to be sequentially optimal. Hence, the difference between long-term and short-term contracts is characterized by a trade-off between inducing effort in the first and in the second period. We analyze the determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its implications for performance measurement and information system design.

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    File URL: http://www.business-research.org/2008/2/accounting/1651/schoendube.pdf
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    Article provided by German Academic Association for Business Research in its journal BuR - Business Research.

    Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 2 (December)
    Pages: 165-186

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    Handle: RePEc:vhb:journl:v:1:y:2008:i:2:p:165-186
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