Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, And International Economic Institutions
To what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efficiency is to be achieved in an interdependent world? This question is at the center of the debate over the future role of the WTO (formerly GATT) in the realm of labor and environmental standards. In this paper we establish that the market access focus of current WTO rules is well equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards. In principle, with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty, not less, these rules can deliver globally efficient outcomes. © 2001 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Volume (Year): 116 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1998.
"The Simple Economics of Labor Standards and the GATT,"
NBER Working Papers
6604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 1998. "The simple economics of labor standards and the Gatt," Working papers 9, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1996.
"Reciprocal Trade Liberalization,"
1150, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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