The Management of Innovation
This paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the 'hired for' doctrine; to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and to provide a rationale for cofinancing arrangements in research activities. Copyright 1994, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Volume (Year): 109 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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