Credibility and Stabilization
This paper deals with stabilization as a one-shot problem to ask what "credibility" means in a world where programs will succeed with probability one. A model is spelled out where the equilibrium program has some ex ante probability of failure. The model draws attention to the factors that raise or lower the probability of success of a stabilization program and, thus, offers a positive theory of stabilization. Reputation that emerges as a central element in repeated games has no role in this model. Copyright 1991, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Volume (Year): 106 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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