Persistent Wage Dispersion and Involuntary Unemployment
It is costly for firms' offers to workers to be turned down both because firms must make additional offers and making offers is costly, and because capital is underused or unused. Provided that workers apply to at least two firms for jobs, there will be wage dispersion in equilibrium and some workers will randomly fail to receive any wage offers. Firms in the same industry with access to the same technology may nevertheless choose different levels of capital intensity. Firms using capital-intensive technologies will pay higher wages. Copyright 1991, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Volume (Year): 106 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/|
|Order Information:||Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00335533|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:1:p:181-202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Pollock-Nelson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.