Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes
The fact that settlement rates are much higher where final-offer arbitration, rather than conventional arbitration, is the dispute settlement procedure is used as the basis of a test of the role of divergent and relatively optimistic expectations in causing disagreement in negotiations. Calculations of identical-expectations contract zones, using existing estimates of models of arbitrator behavior, yield larger identical-expectations contract zones in conventional arbitration than in final-offer arbitration. This evidence clearly suggests that divergent expectations alone are not an adequate explanation of disagreement in labor-management negotiations. A number of alternative explanations for disagreement are suggested and evaluated. Copyright 1989, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Volume (Year): 104 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/|
|Order Information:||Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00335533|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:1:p:99-120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Pollock-Nelson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.