Heterogeneous Preferences, Compensating Wage Differentials, and Comparable Worth
This paper sets up a general-equilibrium model of a world of heterogeneous jobs and heterogeneous tastes, and uses the model to analyze effects of (1) employer discrimination and (2) requiring "equal pay for jobs of comparable worth." It shows that employment of women and men will fall due to comparable wo rth; that, when tastes are heterogeneous, neither comparable worth no r the simple compensating differentials model on which it is based pr ovides useful insights into wage determination; and that, with hetero geneous tastes, there is no reason to expect equal pay for jobs of " comparable worth" even absent employer discrimination. Copyright 1987, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Volume (Year): 102 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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