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Group Dynamics of Corruption in Public Organizations


  • Omer Gokcekus
  • Adam Godet


When there are two groups of officials in a public organization, we show that depending on the groups' behavior - collusive or competitive - increasing the level of monitoring and punishment may have different impacts on corruption. If the two groups of public officials had been demonstrating collusive behavior, increased monitoring or punishment reduces both the level of corrupt activities and the corrupt officials' bribe revenues. However, if the groups had not been colluding, increased monitoring reduces the level of corruption, but increases the corruption revenues collected. Only after reaching the optimum level of monitoring, is this result reversed.

Suggested Citation

  • Omer Gokcekus & Adam Godet, 2006. "Group Dynamics of Corruption in Public Organizations," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(4), pages 275-287.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jpolrf:v:9:y:2006:i:4:p:275-287
    DOI: 10.1080/13841280601107075

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    2. Sanjeev Gupta, 1998. "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?," IMF Working Papers 98/76, International Monetary Fund.
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    Monitoring; punishment; corruption; public sector;


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