Designing Market Socialism: Trustees of State Property
Market reform in China and other Asian post-communist states has renewed academic interest in the study of market socialism in the past two decades. This article attempts to answer the question: can market socialism, a market-based form of socialism within the political context of one-party communist rule, become competitive and efficient like market capitalism? We examine the fundamental problems of market socialism, particularly in the context of Chinese reform, based on property rights and principal-agent theory. This article seeks feasible solutions by developing a new Trustee of State Property (TSP) system based on a scientific design of benefit and risk mechanism.
Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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