Who is protected from budget cuts?
Standard policy advice at times of fiscal adjustment is to protect public spending on the poor. However, the political economy of fiscal adjustment could well indicate the opposite direction, to protect the non-poor from adjustment. This point is illustrated by three case studies based on research on social programs in Argentina, Bangladesh, and India, focusing on how targeting performance varied with aggregate outlays. The results suggest a tendency for program spending on the non-poor that is protected from budget cuts.
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Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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