US macroeconomic conditions and asymmetric adjustment in Presidential approval
While voters may punish governments for worsening economic conditions, they may not reward them symmetrically for improving conditions. We examine whether US macroeconomic conditions affect Presidential approval asymmetrically using quarterly data from 1961_I to 2009_II. The results suggest that the relationship between Presidential approval and economic aggregates is nonlinear. Long-run causality runs from the economic variables to Presidential support. The speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium relationship also differs when conditions worsen from when they improve. Finally, we explore the impact of other factors, such as war and Presidential scandal on Presidential approval.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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