Impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint Forest Management Programme: a study from forest-dependent households in West Bengal
This study seeks to explore the impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme between the government and forest fringe communities of a province in West Bengal, India. It suggests that if there is no incentive plan for the poor, it is hard for the government to monitor their actions. The poor tend to take welfare subsidies and yet harvest optimally. A good incentive fee dependent on their work (output) is required for livelihood sustenance of poor people and sustainability of forest resources.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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