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Impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint Forest Management Programme: a study from forest-dependent households in West Bengal


  • Nimai Das
  • Debnarayan Sarker


This study seeks to explore the impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme between the government and forest fringe communities of a province in West Bengal, India. It suggests that if there is no incentive plan for the poor, it is hard for the government to monitor their actions. The poor tend to take welfare subsidies and yet harvest optimally. A good incentive fee dependent on their work (output) is required for livelihood sustenance of poor people and sustainability of forest resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Nimai Das & Debnarayan Sarker, 2009. "Impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint Forest Management Programme: a study from forest-dependent households in West Bengal," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 323-331.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jpolrf:v:12:y:2009:i:4:p:323-331
    DOI: 10.1080/17487870903314617

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    Cited by:

    1. Das, Nimai, 2010. "Incidence of forest income on reduction of inequality: Evidence from forest dependent households in milieu of joint forest management," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(8), pages 1617-1625, June.


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