Transition and reform in a predatory state: the case of Paraguay
This paper examines the problems of public and institutional reforms within the context of a so-called predatory state. The predatory state is one that acts in the interest of an elite rather than pursue a coherent strategy for economic development. The argument is that, even after the process of political transition is begun, important reforms are blocked by a lingering institutional overhang that continues to serve the predatory elite. We examine the experience of Paraguay that disposed of its dictator in 1989 and began a democratic transition. The failure to implement needed reforms is shown to have blocked a revival of economic growth and development.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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