Transition and reform in a predatory state: the case of Paraguay
This paper examines the problems of public and institutional reforms within the context of a so-called predatory state. The predatory state is one that acts in the interest of an elite rather than pursue a coherent strategy for economic development. The argument is that, even after the process of political transition is begun, important reforms are blocked by a lingering institutional overhang that continues to serve the predatory elite. We examine the experience of Paraguay that disposed of its dictator in 1989 and began a democratic transition. The failure to implement needed reforms is shown to have blocked a revival of economic growth and development.
Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GPRE19|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GPRE19|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:jpolrf:v:11:y:2008:i:2:p:101-114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.