Determinants of Withdrawals of Anti-Dumping Complaints in the EU
The study proposes a model explaining what determines the emergence (or re-emergence) of collusion between complainants and defendants during anti-dumping (AD) investigations. Based on theoretical and empirical evidence, we assume that collusion results in withdrawals of complaints and is thus observable. The probability of collusion can be explained by the variables from four areas: domestic political economy, international strategic trade policy, international industry-level bargaining, and industry and product characteristics. The model is verified with probit regressions for the EU AD cases, having good explanatory power.
Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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