Property networks of corporations as cause of abusive behaviour: a stock market analysis based on institutional economics
The present study deals with the fact that it seems as if executive boards have developed a self-service-mentality concerning the corporations they are meant to manage. The surprise about this is not the attempt of exploitation (rather the opposite would be surprising from an economic point of view) but the apparent absence of sanctions imposed by the owners. This study shows that this behaviour of corporations’ owners is at least to a main part due to the fact, that the reciprocal property of corporations prevents the exercise of certain property rights by the 'true’ holders.
Volume (Year): 1 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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- Goyal, Vidhan K. & Park, Chul W., 2002. "Board leadership structure and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66, January.
- L. A. A. Van den Berghe & Abigail Levrau, 2004. "Evaluating Boards of Directors: what constitutes a good corporate board?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 461-478, October.
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