Corporate Strategies – The Institutional Approach
The present paper introduces a model of corporate strategies, based on institutional theories of the firm and formalized with the concepts of the theory of games. Corporate strategies are balanced outcomes of four social games: capital market, corporate governance, product market and social responsibility. Two empirical applications of the model are then introduced: a qualitative one, consisting in comparative study of strategies deployed by Royal Dutch Shell and Israel Corporation, then a quantitative one, presenting a study of capital accumulation and operational efficiency in 79 companies listed in the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
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