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Organizational forms in the knowledge economy: a comparative institutional analysis

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  • Erkan Gürpınar

    () (Social Sciences University of Ankara)

Abstract

Abstract This paper provides a framework with which to analyze organizational forms in the knowledge economy. We focus on an important trade-off facing modern firms: firms can acquire the property of all the innovations developed by their employees and can greatly increase their profits, yet this type of private intellectual property rights regime can discourage the innovative effort of the very same workers. Allowing workers to carry their knowledge outside the firm eliminates this disincentive. Hence, strategic complementarities may exist between innovative partners and a disclosure driven intellectual property rights regime, and passive employees and a private intellectual property rights regime. An evolutionary game theoretic model demonstrates these strategic complementarities and shows when economies tend towards disclosure driven or private intellectual property rights regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Erkan Gürpınar, 2016. "Organizational forms in the knowledge economy: a comparative institutional analysis," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 501-518, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:26:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s00191-016-0452-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-016-0452-x
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary games; Intellectual property rights; Technology;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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