Relational contracts in a persistent environment
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
- Toshihiko Mukoyama & Ayşegül Şahin, 2005. "Repeated moral hazard with persistence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(4), pages 831-854, June.
- Marina Halac, 2012. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 750-779, April.
- Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
- Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-465, March.
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
- Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
- Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2010. "Dynamic Relational Contracts with Credit Constraints," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1009, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Juan F. Escobar & Juuso Toikka, 2013.
"Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1887-1934, September.
- Juan F. Escobar & Juuso Toikka, 2012. "Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information," Documentos de Trabajo 289, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
- David McAdams, 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 107-142, November.
- Clive Bull, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 147-159.
- Jin Li & Niko Matouschek, 2013. "Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2328-2351, October.
- Simon Board, 2011. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3349-3367, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017.
"Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection,"
Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 18-22.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Post-Print halshs-01630253, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsRelational contracts; Persistence; Moral hazard; History-independent contracts; Stationary contracts;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:61:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-015-0891-x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.