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Competing over a finite number of locations

Listed author(s):
  • Matías Núñez

    ()

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, UFR d’Economie et Gestion)

  • Marco Scarsini

    ()

    (LUISS)

Abstract We consider a Hotelling location game where retailers can choose one of a finite number of locations. Consumers have strict preferences over the possible available store locations and retailers aim to attract the maximum number of consumers. We prove that a pure strategy equilibrium exists if the number of retailers is large enough. Moreover, as the number of retailers grows large, in equilibrium the distribution of retailers over the locations converges to the distribution of consumers’ preferences.

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File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-015-0068-6
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Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2016)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 125-136

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Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:4:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-015-0068-6
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0068-6
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Web page: http://www.saet.uiowa.edu/

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  1. Ehud Kalai, 2002. "Large Robust Games," Discussion Papers 1350, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
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  8. Guilherme Carmona, 2011. "Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 31-45, September.
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  11. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1975. "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 27-49.
  12. Gaëtan Fournier & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00983085, HAL.
  13. Andrew McLennan & Paulo K. Monteiro & Rabee Tourky, 2011. "Games With Discontinuous Payoffs: A Strengthening of Reny's Existence Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(5), pages 1643-1664, 09.
  14. Pim Heijnen & Adriaan Soetevent, 2014. "Price Competition on Graphs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-131/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  15. Luciano Castro, 2011. "Equilibrium existence and approximation of regular discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 67-85, September.
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