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Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

Author

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  • Xenia Matschke

    () (Fachbereich IV-VWL, Universität Trier and CESifo, Universitätsring 15, 54296 Trier, Germany; corresponding author.)

  • Anja Schöttner

    () (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, PO-Box 144, 78457 Konstanz, Germany;)

Abstract

Trade liberalization under GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Xenia Matschke & Anja Schöttner, 2013. "Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 81-105, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:80:1:y:2013:p:81-105
    DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-2010.028
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2010.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2006. "Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 874-900, August.
    2. Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 2002. "Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy under Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 895-918, August.
    3. Leonard K. Cheng & Larry D. Qiu & Kit Pong Wong, 2001. "Anti-dumping measures as a tool of protectionism: A mechanism design approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 639-660, August.
    4. Philippe Kohler & Michael O. Moore, 2001. "Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 42-59, July.
    5. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455, Elsevier.
    6. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kaz Miyagiwa & Huasheng Song & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2016. "Accounting for Stylised Facts about Recent Anti-dumping: Retaliation and Innovation," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 221-235, February.
    2. Phillip McCalman & Frank Stähler & Gerald Willmann, 2019. "Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(2), pages 227-255, May.
    3. Phillip McCalman & Frank Stähler & Gerald Willmann, 2019. "Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(2), pages 227-255, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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