Putting Agency and Integrity to the Test
This article examines recent claims about the necessity of integrity in agency relationships by putting agents with preferences that reflect integrity in an evolutionary competition with opportunistic agents. Corporate culture is modeled through a process of assortative matching between principal and agent types (via industry or group effects). This leads to a characterization of corporate governance where integrity is linked with value creation.
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Volume (Year): 77 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
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