IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

On Delays in Project Completion with Cost Reduction: An Experiment


  • Shubhro Sarkar

    () (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Gen. A.K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon East, Mumbai, 400065, India)

  • Anthony M. Kwasnica

    () (Smeal College of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA)


We examine the voluntary provision of a public project via binary contributions when contributions may be made over multiple periods. In many situations, early contributors are likely to pay a higher cost than those who wait. We show that in such circumstances the provision of the project always involves delay. Because this game involves coordination on complex, dynamic strategies in the face of asymmetries in payoffs, we examine behavior in the laboratory.

Suggested Citation

  • Shubhro Sarkar & Anthony M. Kwasnica, 2011. "On Delays in Project Completion with Cost Reduction: An Experiment," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 557-584, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:77:3:y:2011:p:557-584

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:77:3:y:2011:p:557-584. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laura Razzolini). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.