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The Deadliest of Games: The Institution of Dueling

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher G. Kingston

    () (Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002, USA;)

  • Robert E. Wright

    () (Augustana College, 2001 South Summit Avenue, Sioux Falls, SD 57197, USA.)

Abstract

Recent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational basis. Basically, under certain social and economic conditions, individuals must fight in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. We use a repeated two-player sequential game with random matching to show how the institution of dueling could have functioned as a costly but incentive-compatible means by which individuals could demonstrate their good faith dealings by defending their "honor."

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher G. Kingston & Robert E. Wright, 2010. "The Deadliest of Games: The Institution of Dueling," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1094-1106, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:76:4:y:2010:p:1094-1106
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.76.4.1094
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Behrooz Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz & Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2013. "Identity, Authority and Evolution of Order: the trajectory of dueling simulated," MPRA Paper 48219, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jul 2013.
    2. Hassani Mahmooei, Behrooz & Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2012. "Dueling for honor and identity economics," MPRA Paper 44370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Vahabi, Mehrdad & Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz, 2016. "The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 57-72.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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