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Arbitration and Bargaining across the Pacific


  • Cary Deck

    () (University of Arkansas, Walton College of Business, Department of Economics, 402 WCOB, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA)

  • Amy Farmer

    () (University of Arkansas, Walton College of Business, Department of Economics, 402 WCOB, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA)

  • Dao-Zhi Zeng

    () (Tohoku University, Graduate School of Information Sciences, Aoba 6-3-09, Aramaki, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980- 8579, Japan)


This paper reports laboratory experiments comparing arbitration behavior between and across two countries with extensive trade relations, the United States and Japan. Besides comparing disputes in both locations, we evaluate disputes between them. While we find nominal differences between the countries, we observe significant changes in both groups’ behavior when facing someone from the other country. Specifically, Americans seek larger profits when facing a Japanese counterpart and Japanese subjects settle more frequently with an American counterpart. Our results suggest that the literature on bargaining behavior across cultures paints an incomplete picture of international comparisons by failing to consider bargaining interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Cary Deck & Amy Farmer & Dao-Zhi Zeng, 2009. "Arbitration and Bargaining across the Pacific," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 183-197, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:76:1:y:2009:p:183-197

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Maldonado, Dario & Pestieau, Pierre, 2007. "Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(10), pages 2041-2061, November.
    2. Sanna Tenhunen & Matti Tuomala, 2010. "On Optimal Lifetime Redistribution Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 171-198, February.
    3. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2001. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisted," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(3), pages 781-799, August.
    4. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2003. "Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2475-2490, October.
    5. Diamond, Peter & Koszegi, Botond, 2003. "Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1839-1872, September.
    6. Martin Feldstein, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 303-320.
    7. Ayşe İmrohoroğlu & Selahattin İmrohoroğlu & Douglas H. Joines, 2003. "Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Social Security," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(2), pages 745-784.
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    Cited by:

    1. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
    2. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Jeon, Joo Young & Ramalingam, Abhijit, 2016. "Identity and group conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 107-121.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation


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