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Polluters and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence


  • Richard Damania

    () (Department of Economics, Adelaide University)

  • Per G. Fredriksson

    () (Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University)

  • Thomas Osang

    () (Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University)


We suggest a new perspective on firms' ability to organize collective action. We argue that industries that face a greater number of regulations have an easier time forming a lobby group and sustaining joint lobbying efforts. In particular, firms in industries that are pollution intensive, and therefore incur abatement costs, face an extra policy issue compared with other industries. The prediction that emerges from the theory is that more polluting industries should have greater levels of lobbying contributions. Using U.S. manufacturing sector data, we find empirical support for this hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Damania & Per G. Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2005. "Polluters and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 167-185, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:72:1:y:2005:p:167-185

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Svensson, Lars E O, 1999. "Price-Level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting: A Free Lunch?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 277-295, August.
    9. C Freedman, 2001. "Inflation Targeting And The Economy: Lessons From Canada'S First Decade," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 2-19, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2006. "On the Link Between Democracy and Environment," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-355, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy


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