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The Campus Parking Game: A Demonstration of Price Discrimination and Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Jeffrey Michael

    (Department of Economics, Towson University)

  • Arthur Zillante

    () (ICES, George Mason University)

  • Sarah Stafford

    (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

  • Greg Buchholz

    (School of Business Administration, Missouri Southern State University)

  • Katherine Guthrie

    (Department of Economics, University of Michigan)

  • Julia Heath

    (Department of Economics, University of Memphis)

Abstract

This article presents a classroom game that allows students to directly experience the welfare improvements that can result from price discrimination. The demonstration uses a very familiar decision-making scenario, campus parking, to introduce the concept of price discrimination as well as reinforce the concepts of opportunity cost, consumer surplus, and search costs. This game can be used in a variety of classes, including principles, intermediate theory, industrial organization, or environmental economics, and can be conducted in a 50-minute class period with follow-up discussion in the next class.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Michael & Arthur Zillante & Sarah Stafford & Greg Buchholz & Katherine Guthrie & Julia Heath, 2005. "The Campus Parking Game: A Demonstration of Price Discrimination and Efficiency," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 668-682, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:71:3:y:2005:p:668-682
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2010. "A probabilistic analysis of two university parking issues," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, pages 111-120.
    2. Paul Johnson & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Economics Works! Experiments in High School Classrooms," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, pages 149-156.
    3. Edward Lopez & David Molina, 2010. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Apology Not Necessary," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, pages 383-397.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General

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