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Determinants of Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement: The Role of Trade Sanctions


  • Eric P. Chiang

    () (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University)


With growing trade in a global economy, the desire for trade protection becomes increasingly important. One aspect of trade protection that has risen to the forefront is the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) across national borders. This article analyzes the determinants of U.S.-filed investigations for alleged IPR cross-border violations using the complete set of Section 337 investigations conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). By analyzing political, institutional, and economic variables in an industry-level model, we find evidence that investigations are more frequent in industries that face intense import competition among IPR-protected goods. In addition, greater technology access to U.S. patents by respondent firms is found to increase filings, especially in countries where corruption levels are higher.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric P. Chiang, 2004. "Determinants of Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement: The Role of Trade Sanctions," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 424-440, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:71:2:y:2004:p:424-440

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    Cited by:

    1. Alireza Naghavi & Yingyi Tsai, 2015. "Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(2), pages 211-226, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade


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