Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins
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- Kastl, Jakub, 2012. "On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 339-352.
- Bresky, Michal, 2013.
"Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 205-217.
- Michal Bresky, 2009. "Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp384, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
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