Right-to-Work Laws: New Evidence from the Stock Market
This article is an empirical examination of whether or not stockholder wealth rises in response to passage of a right-to-work law—a state law banning union security clauses from collective bargaining agreements. Stockholder wealth rose when Louisiana passed such a law in 1976 and when Idaho did so in 1985–1986. Presumably this occurred because investors anticipated higher future profits with weaker labor unions or a lower probability of future organization. This is new evidence that such laws are more than symbolic: They hamper labor unions.
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Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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