Choosing Winners and Losers in a Classroom Permit Trading Game
This paper presents a classroom game in which students trade pollution permits. By changing the distribution of permits across firms, the game shows students how the allocation of property rights determines the winners and losers in the permit trading system but does not affect the efficiency of the system. This game can be used in a variety of classes, including principles or environmental economics, and can be conducted in a 50-minute class period with follow-up discussion in the next class.
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Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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- Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March.
- Cason, T.N. & Gangadharan, L., 1997.
"An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
592, The University of Melbourne.
- Cason, Timothy N & Gangadharan, Lata, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 55-73, July.
- Plott, Charles R., .
"Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets,"
180, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Plott, Charles R, 1983. "Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369), pages 106-27, March.
- Charles A. Holt, 1996. "Classroom Games: Trading in a Pit Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 193-203, Winter.
- R. Andrew Muller & Stuart Mestelman, 1998.
"What have we learned from emissions trading experiments?,"
Managerial and Decision Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4-5), pages 225-238.
- Stuart Mestelman & Andrew Muller, 1997. "What Have We Learned From Emissions Trading Experiments?," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 1997-03, McMaster University.
- Nugent, Rachel A, 1997. "Teaching Tools: A Pollution Rights Trading Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 679-85, July.
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