Green Taxes in a Federal Context: An Empirical Model for Industrial Waste in Spain
This paper reveals that the design of the green taxes levied on the production of industrial waste by certain regional governments in Spain does not appear to reduce environmental damage. This may be because these taxes try to mitigate financial shorts, tax rates are too low and are fixed arbitrarily, and agents react to tax differentials across regions by disposing of their waste in regions with lower or null tax rates or illegally dumping it. This suggests that the environmental issues related to the disposal of industrial waste should be supervised by the national government or somehow coordinated across regions.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rre:publsh:v:40:y:2010:i:1:p:27-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark L. Burkey)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.