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Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’

  • Christophe Déprés

    ()

    (UMR INRA-ENESAD CESAER et Cemagref, 24, avenue des Landais, BP 5085, 63172 Aubière Cedex)

  • Gilles Grolleau

    (UMR INRA-ENESAD (CESAER), 26, rue du Dr. Petitjean, BP 87999, 21079 Dijon)

  • Naoufel Mzoughi

    (UMR INRA-ENESAD (CESAER), 26, rue du Dr. Petitjean, BP 87999, 21079 Dijon Cedex)

Le caractère ‘collectif’ de certains biens et services a souvent légitimé, parfois indûment, l’intervention de la ‘main visible’ de l’Etat. L’économie néo-institutionnelle initiée par Coase conteste cette vision en interrogeant la nature même des biens et en resituant le débat sur le terrain de l’efficience économique. Prenant acte, nous définissons le concept de bien en référence à son mode de financement, de production et d’accès, ce qui fait apparaître son caractère construit. L’approche coasienne cherche, dans une perspective comparative, à identifier les arrangements institutionnels réels susceptibles de minimiser l’ensemble des coûts de production et de transaction. Une telle approche n’aboutit pas nécessairement à la négation de l’intervention étatique, mais plutôt à une redéfinition des modalités de son intervention afin de permettre la réalisation des bénéfices propres aux arrangements privés. La mobilisation de la grille d’analyse de l’économie des coûts de transaction nous permet de mettre en évidence la diversité des arrangements possibles sur un continuum allant du ‘tout-Etat’ au ‘tout-marché’. Nous étudions trois arrangements institutionnels susceptibles d’aboutir à la production non publique stricto sensu de biens publics d’environnement : l’association de bénéfices privés, l’organisation collective, la contractualisation. Les modalités d’implication des pouvoirs publics sont mentionnées, en insistant sur le degré de mixité des arrangements institutionnels. Les exemples évoqués concernent essentiellement le secteur agricole, où la nature collective de certaines productions environnementales a considérablement servi à justifier l’intervention de l’Etat.

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Article provided by INRA Department of Economics in its journal Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales.

Volume (Year): 74 (2005)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 27-45

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Handle: RePEc:rae:jouces:v:74:y:2005:i::p:27-45
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  1. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
  2. Demsetz, Harold, 1970. "The Private Production of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 293-306, October.
  3. Kenneth Goldin, 1977. "Equal access vs. Selective access: A critique of public goods theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 53-71, March.
  4. Grolleau, 2001. "Management environnemental et exploitation agricole," Working Papers 156045, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  5. Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  6. JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, 1996. "Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods from Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 935-945.
  7. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-42, April.
  8. Stéphane Saussier & Claude Ménard, 2000. "Contractual Choice and Performance the Case of Water Supply in France," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 385-404.
  9. Van Zandt, David E, 1993. "The Lessons of the Lighthouse: "Government" or "Private" Provision of Goods," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 47-72, January.
  10. Slangen, Louis H G, 1997. "How to Organise Nature Production by Farmers," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 24(3-4), pages 508-29.
  11. Douadia Bougherara & Gilles Grolleau & Luc Thiébaut, 2003. "Réputation environnementale en agro-alimentaire : « milieu de production » versus « processus de production »," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, vol. 0(1), pages 121-144.
  12. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
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