Territorial politics in hard times: the welfare state under pressure in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom
The author argues that the design of decentralized political institutions shapes the effect of economic crisis on the welfare state. He proposes a simple framework for understanding the effects of crisis on areas under the responsibility of regional governments: their responses and mediating effects will vary with the financial system, degree of regional input into central decisions, and legal framework. Further, the ways in which territorial political institutions channel economic pressures should lead to changing territorial politics as the relative resources and credibility of governments change. The author discusses the influence of territorial political institutions on responses to economic crisis in Germany, Spain, and the UK. It is concluded that Germany is most likely to proceed unchanged, Spain might see the hardest landing due to the difficult finances of many regional governments, and devolution in the UK is economically sustainable and limits negative welfare-state effects but might be politically unsustainable. The conclusion suggests that welfare-state analysis should take more account of specific territorial political institutions, that further analysis should include local government, and that economic pressure might reshape territorial politics in at least some countries.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pio:envirc:v:28:y:2010:i:3:p:405-419. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Neil Hammond)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.