Methodological Issues in Measuring and Interpreting Taxable Income Elasticities
Because the response of taxable income to the income tax rate captures all of the responses to taxation, it holds the promise of more accurately summarizing the marginal efficiency cost of taxation than a narrower measure of taxpayer response such as the labor supply elasticity. The promise does, though, come with problems and caveats. This paper reviews the key issues in empirically measuring the taxable income elasticity and in using it to evaluate tax reform. I stress the idea that the taxable income elasticity is a matter of government policy, rather than an immutable parameter, and note the importance of looking for revenue offsets in other tax bases and other time periods.
Volume (Year): 51 (1998)
Issue (Month): n. 4 (December)
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