Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective
Tax policy is a product of politics, so a complete understanding of tax policy requires an explicit recognition of the political environment within which tax policy is made. The paper emphasizes the concept of political costs associated with the tax system and discusses several aspects of tax policy using a public choice approach. The paper argues that the political costs associated with taxation can be minimized by embedding the tax system within a relatively inflexible fiscal constitution. Despite the insights the public choice perspective offers, most analysis of tax policy does not take public choice considerations into account.
Volume (Year): 51 (1998)
Issue (Month): n. 2 (June)
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