The Political Efficiency of General Taxation
Argues that unconstrained legislative majorities overtax political minorities and proposes that a general principle of a uniform, proportional rate of tax be applied at all income levels.
Volume (Year): 46 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 725 15th St. NW #600. Washington, D.C. 20005-2109|
Fax: (202) 737-7308
Web page: http://www.ntanet.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:46:y:1993:i:no._4:p:401-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charmaine Wright)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.