The Problem of Strategic Effect in International Competition
The article considers the concept of strategic effect in international economic relations in a narrow sense, as a gain of national economy from purposeful support of the branches participating in international competition on oligopolistic markets. The mechanism of the competition of this kind according to the theory developed by J. Brander and B. Spencer is analyzed. The influence of the government support of domestic producers on the situation on oligopolistic markets and the opportunities of carrying out such policy under conditions of the effective WTO rules are considered (subsidization of aircraft industry by the WTO members is analyzed as an example).
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