Corporate Governance in Russian Companies
The article studies the development of corporate governance in Russian companies in the contexts of both economic growth and world crisis. The interests of domestic or foreign shareholders and top managers work as incentives for improving corporate governance tools. These interests are determined by a number of economic and institutional conditions. In the 2000s, Russian businesses entered world financial markets (including stock exchanges) and mergers and acquisitions markets. The participation of foreign shareholders in equity and control of domestic companies has been growing. These trends have resulted in intense use of corporate governance standards under the impact of stock market regulations and the disciplined influence of foreign shareholders, managers, and nonexecutive (independent) directors. The crisis has dramatically reduced the decision-making horizon, discredited IPOs, violated minor shareholders' rights, and increased management opportunism and stockholders' return to executive management.
Volume (Year): 52 (2009)
Issue (Month): 6 (October)
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