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El SME: un modelo de comportamiento asimétrico

  • M. Isabel García Gracia

    (Dpto. Fundamentos de Análisis Económico. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.)

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    El objetivo de este trabajo se centra en analizar una serie de rasgos teóricos y empíricos que ponen de manifiesto y avalan el cumplimiento del modelo líder-seguidores en la practica del funcionamiento del Sistema Monetario Europeo (SME). Para ello, en primer lugar, se presentan unos resultados teóricos a partir de los cuales se deducen unos elementos que refuerzan la autonomía a independencia de la política monetaria de un país frente a los demás, en un contexto de tipos de cambio fijos-ajustables y libertad total para los movimientos de capital. En segundo lugar, del análisis de las pruebas empíricas disponibles relacionadas con las intervenciones cambiarias, se deduce el papel de líder que ha desempeñado el Bundesbank en la determinación del tipo de cambio de las monedas del SME frente al dolar y la relevancia del marco alemán como moneda pivote del Sistema. El cumplimiento de este modelo asimétrico le ha permitido a Alemnaia liberarse, en gran medida, del peso de los ajustes monetarios ante perturbaciones o crisis cambiarias y mantener una política monetaria autónoma orientada a conseguir su objetivo de bajas tasas de inflación. The objective of this paper is to analyse certain theoretical and empirical aspects that underline and support the leader-follower model as that being used by The European Monetary System (EMS). Firstly, theoretical results are presented which imply and reinforce the independence of monetary policy of different ountries, in a context of fixed-adjustable exchange rates and perfect capital flows. Secondly, an analysis of available empirical tests related to exchange rate intervention is used to show that the role of leader has been taken by the Busdenbank as far as determining the EMS currencies exchange rates against the dollar is concerned, and that the Deutschmark has acted as the pivot currency in the System. The fulfilment of this asymetric model has allowed Germany to laegely liberate itself of the weight of the monetary adjustements required during perturbations or exchange rate crisis, and maintain an independant monetary policy designe to achieve the objetive of low inflation rates.

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    Article provided by Estudios de Economía Aplicada in its journal Estudios de Economía Aplicada.

    Volume (Year): 3 (1995)
    Issue (Month): (Junio)
    Pages: 41-68

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    Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:3_2_3
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    1. Giavazzi, Francesco & Pagano, Marco, 1986. "The Advantages of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 135, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. De Grauwe, Paul, 1989. "Is the European Monetary System a DM-Zone?," CEPR Discussion Papers 297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Marcus Miller & Mark Salmon, 1985. "Policy Coordination and Dynamic Games," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 184-227 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 274-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Cohen, Daniel & Michel, Philippe, 1988. "How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 263-74, April.
    6. Stephen J. Turnovsky & Tamer Basar & Vasco d'Orey, 1987. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," NBER Working Papers 2467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Michele Fratianni & Juergen Hagen, 1990. "German dominance in the EMS," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 67-87, February.
    8. Goodhart, Charles, 1990. "Economists' perspectives on the EMS : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 471-487, December.
    9. Artis, Michael J & Taylor, Mark P, 1988. "Exchange Rates and the EMS: Assessing the Track Record," CEPR Discussion Papers 250, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L, 1986. "Credibility and Time Inconsistency in a Stochastic World," CEPR Discussion Papers 94, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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