¿Los Sistemas de Garantía se orientan al prestatario o a las entidades de crédito? Estudio de la experiencia en Latinoamérica/Are Guarantee Systems oriented towards borrowers or credit institutions? Study of the Latin American Experience
Los sistemas de garantía responden a diversos tipos de esquemas y presentan diseños particulares sin que se haya estudiado hasta la fecha la eficacia de los mismos. Por otra parte, la actividad de garantía es beneficiosa para el empresario y para la entidad financiera, encontrando ambos agentes intereses comunes en los mismos que, unidos a los del sector público, configuran la actividad de garantía como una política que encuentre los vectores de coordinación más eficaces. El objetivo de este trabajo es explicar si las características de los sistemas se orientan a la atención de las entidades de crédito o de los prestatarios. Nuestros resultados revelan que los sistemas latinoamerica¬nos utilizan a las entidades crediticias como distribuidoras y son las características relacionadas con satisfacer las necesidades de la banca las que determinan un mayor número de pymes beneficiarias. Guarantee Systems answer to different types of schemes and show particular designs although they have not been studied until now the effectiveness of them. Anyway, guarantee activity is beneficial for the entrepreneur and for financial institutions, finding common interests on them that, joined to the public sector, shape the guarantee activity as a policy that find the most effective coordination vectors between agents. The purpose of this paper is to explain if the characteristics of the guarantee systems are focused on credit institutions or the borrowers. Our results disclose that Latinoamerican systems use credit entities as allocators and the characteristics related with the satisfaction of banking needs are critical for a larger number of attended businesses.
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Volume (Year): 31 (2013)
Issue (Month): (Enero)
Pages: 251 (20pags)
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