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The Demand for Individual Grievance Procedures in Germany and Spain: Labour Law Changes versus Business Cycle/La demanda de reclamaciones laborales individuales en Alemania y España: Derecho Laboral versus Ciclo Económico

Author

Listed:
  • FRICK, BERND

    () (Department of Management, UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN, and Institute of Labour Law and Industral Relations, UNIVERSITY OF TRIER, GERMANY.)

  • MALO, MIGUEL A.

    () (Departamento de Economía. Universidad de Salamanca. Campus Miguel de Unamuno. 37007- Salamanca (923294640))

  • GARCIA MARTINEZ, PILAR

    () (Department of Applied Economics, UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA, SPAIN.)

  • SCHNEIDER, MARTIN

    () (Department of Management, UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN, and Institute of Labour Law and Industral Relations, UNIVERSITY OF TRIER, GERMANY.)

Abstract

In this article, we analyze the determinants of annual number of grievance procedures, mainly individual complaints against unfair dismissals. Econometric analyses using two balanced panels from the 11 West German states (1964-2006) and the 17 autonomous regions of Spain (1987-2006) show that labour market characteristics, such as the unemployment and the vacancy rate have a much stronger influence on the cyclical demand for individual grievance procedures than changes in “workers’ rights”. Thus, the individual costs of unemployment are better predictors of the demand for individual grievance procedures than institutional changes strengthening or weakening employees’ rights. En este artículo, se analizan los determinantes del número de procesos de despido individual improcedente. Los análisis econométricos realizados usando dos paneles equilibrados de datos de 11 estados de Alemania del Oeste (1964-2006) y 17 comunidades autónomas de España (1987-2006) muestran que algunas características del mercado de trabajo tales como la tasa de desempleo o la de vacantes tienen una influencia mayor en la demanda cíclica de reclamaciones individuales que los cambios en los derechos de los trabajadores. Así, el coste individual del desempleo predice mejor las reclamaciones por despido y salariales que los cambios institucionales que alteran los derechos de los trabajadores.

Suggested Citation

  • Frick, Bernd & Malo, Miguel A. & Garcia Martinez, Pilar & Schneider, Martin, 2012. "The Demand for Individual Grievance Procedures in Germany and Spain: Labour Law Changes versus Business Cycle/La demanda de reclamaciones laborales individuales en Alemania y España: Derecho Laboral v," Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Estudios de Economía Aplicada, vol. 30, pages 283-310, Abril.
  • Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:30_1_9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tribunales Laborales; despidos; protección por despido; desempleo; vacantes ; Labour Courts; Dismissals; Dismissal Protection; Unemployment; Vacancies.;

    JEL classification:

    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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