Cooperación en modelos de Cournot con información incompleta/Cooperation in Cournot’s Models with Incomplete Information
Se estudia el oligopolio de Cournot donde el proceso de ajuste de la producción se realiza considerando que las empresas carecen de información completa sobre el comportamiento de sus competidoras. En este contexto, suponiendo la intención cooperativa como factor fundamental, se alcanzan equilibrios cooperativos empleando sistemas dinámicos discretos que tienen en cuenta la interacción repetida de las empresas. El trabajo muestra que la cooperación es posible sin necesidad de acuerdo previo. Cournot oligopoly is studied under the circumstances that firms do not have complete information about their competitors' behaviour. In this context, assuming that cooperative intention is the main aspect, we can reach cooperative equilibriums by employing discrete dynamical systems that take into account repeated interactions between firms. This paper shows that cooperation is possible without a previous agreement.
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Volume (Year): 29 (2011)
Issue (Month): (Abril)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2008.
"Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 287-303, January.
- Gian-Italo Bischi & Ahmad K. Naimzada & Lucia Sbragia, 2004.
"Oligopoly Games with Local Monopolistic Approximation,"
81, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2004.
- Bischi, Gian Italo & Naimzada, Ahmad K. & Sbragia, Lucia, 2007. "Oligopoly games with Local Monopolistic Approximation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 371-388, March.
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