IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/lrk/eeaart/27_2_17.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Subexplotación y sobreexplotación de bienes en régimen de propiedad común/Underuse and Overexploitation of Commons

Author

Listed:
  • FUENTES CASTRO, DANIEL

    () (Departamento de Análisis Económico. UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA.)

Abstract

La mayor parte de la literatura que aborda la gestión de bienes en régimen de propiedad común parte del supuesto que los propietarios ejercen simultáneamente su derecho de uso. Menos atención se le ha prestado al derecho de exclusión (la propiedad sobre un bien faculta no sólo a usarlo, sino también a impedir que otros lo usen). En el primer caso es frecuente encontrar situaciones de sobreexplotación, mientras que en el segundo surge otro tipo de ineficiencia: la subexplotación de bienes en régimen de propiedad común. Con la ayuda de un ejemplo algebraico se muestra, desde el paradigma neoclásico, que las situaciones de subexplotación y de sobreexplotación de bienes en régimen de propiedad común son en realidad ineficiencias del mercado que tienen su origen en el comportamiento de los agentes económicos, en cuestiones relativas al poder de mercado y en la presión ejercida sobre los recursos. Much of the literature on the commons focuses on the fact that many agents are assigned usage rights simultaneously, but less attention has been paid to the exercise of exclusion rights. The simultaneous exercise of one of the two rights by all the owners of a common causes a problem of overexploitation in the first case (competition “in use”) and underuse in the second (competition “in exclusion”). The relevance of both inefficiencies stems from the way they illustrate the general conflict between individual and collective interests. This paper proposes a formal synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of resources in common property regimes. The synthesis takes into account the following features: i) the importance of the consumer surplus for the analysis of the issue; ii) the attitude of economic agents in the face of a reciprocal externality linked to the exploitation of the common; and iii) the social and the private costs of exploitation.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuentes Castro, Daniel, 2009. "Subexplotación y sobreexplotación de bienes en régimen de propiedad común/Underuse and Overexploitation of Commons," Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Estudios de Economía Aplicada, vol. 27, pages 577(16á)-57, Agosto.
  • Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:27_2_17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.revista-eea.net
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Whitney K. Newey & Kenneth D. West, 1994. "Automatic Lag Selection in Covariance Matrix Estimation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 631-653.
    2. Elliott, Graham, 1999. "Efficient Tests for a Unit Root When the Initial Observation Is Drawn from Its Unconditional Distribution," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(3), pages 767-783, August.
    3. Kwiatkowski, Denis & Phillips, Peter C. B. & Schmidt, Peter & Shin, Yongcheol, 1992. "Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root : How sure are we that economic time series have a unit root?," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1-3), pages 159-178.
    4. Dickey, David A & Fuller, Wayne A, 1981. "Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1057-1072, June.
    5. Lutz, Matthias & Singer, H. W., 1994. "The link between increased trade openness and the terms of trade: An empirical investigation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(11), pages 1697-1709, November.
    6. Kim, So Young, 2007. "Openness, External Risk, and Volatility: Implications for the Compensation Hypothesis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(01), pages 181-216, January.
    7. Muhammad Islam, 2004. "The long run relationship between openness and government size: evidence from bounds test," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(9), pages 995-1000.
    8. Bollerslev, Tim, 1986. "Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, pages 307-327.
    9. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 997-1032.
    10. Perron, Pierre & Rodriguez, Gabriel, 2003. "GLS detrending, efficient unit root tests and structural change," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 1-27, July.
    11. Elliott, Graham & Rothenberg, Thomas J & Stock, James H, 1996. "Efficient Tests for an Autoregressive Unit Root," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 813-836, July.
    12. MacKinnon, James G, 1996. "Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and Cointegration Tests," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(6), pages 601-618, Nov.-Dec..
    13. Engle, Robert F, 1982. "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 987-1007, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bienes comunes; anticomunes; sobreexplotación; subexplotación; derechos de propiedad ; commons; anticommons; overexploitation; underuse; rights of property.;

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:27_2_17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Beatriz Rodríguez Prado). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fcvldes.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.