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The disparate adoption of price cap regulation in the U.S. telecommunications and electricity sectors

Author

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  • David E. M. Sappington

    () (University of Florida)

  • Dennis L. Weisman

    (Kansas State University)

Abstract

Abstract Price cap regulation (PCR) has experienced widespread adoption in the U.S. telecommunications industry, but not in the electricity sector. We suggest that these disparate experiences may reflect in part the manner in which PCR often is implemented in the U.S., relatively limited opportunity for “regulatory bargains” in the electricity sector, and relatively limited competition in the transmission and distribution components of this sector.

Suggested Citation

  • David E. M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, 2016. "The disparate adoption of price cap regulation in the U.S. telecommunications and electricity sectors," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 250-264, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:49:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-016-9295-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-016-9295-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:eee:juipol:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:73-81 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price cap regulation; Telecommunications; Electricity;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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